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SPECIAL REPORT
Caveat IRS: Problems With Abandoning the Full Deduction Rule
by Joseph Bankman, David Gamage, Jacob Goldin, Daniel J. Hemel, Darien Shanske, Kirk J. Stark, 
Dennis J. Ventry Jr., and Manoj Viswanathan
I. Introduction
Several states are considering new tax credits 
that would reduce tax liability based on donations 
made by a taxpayer in support of various state 
programs.1 In general, taxpayer contributions to 
qualifying organizations — including public 
charities and private foundations, as well as 
federal, state, local, and tribal governments — 
are eligible for the federal charitable contribution 
deduction under section 170.2 In our previous 
article, we explained how current law supports 
the view that qualifying charitable contributions 
are deductible under section 170, even when the 
donor derives some federal or state tax benefit by 
making the donation.3 We referred to this 
treatment as the “full deduction rule.”
Some commentators have suggested that 
Treasury and the IRS could change existing law, 
whether through new regulations or by issuing a 
new interpretation of existing regulations, to limit 
the deductibility of taxpayer contributions when 
they trigger a state or local tax benefit to the 
donor.4 Many legal and administrative concerns 
are associated with those actions. In this report, 
we argue that even if the IRS has the legal 
authority to implement the changes absent new 
legislation, it should decline to do so.
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In this report, the authors highlight the 
importance of the full deduction rule to 
sound tax administration. Further, they 
demonstrate that any effort to eliminate or 
limit its operation would have to overcome 
two sources of administrative complexity: 
computational difficulties in determining the 
appropriate amount of a donor’s deduction 
and definitional challenges arising from 
allowing donors to claim a full deduction 
(undiminished by the value of any tax 
benefits) only for gifts to nongovernmental 
donees.
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1
As of this writing, proposed legislation has been introduced in 
California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Virginia, and 
Washington.
2
Section 170(a).
3
Joseph Bankman et al., “State Responses to Federal Tax Reform: 
Understanding the Emerging Battle Over State Charitable Tax Credits,” 
Tax Notes, Apr. 30, 2018, p. 641.
4
See, e.g., Andy Grewal, “Can States Game the Republican Tax Bill 
With the Charitable Contribution Strategy?” Yale J. Regulation (Jan. 3, 
2018); Eric Rasmussen, “Getting Around the State and Local Tax 
Deduction Limit,” SSRN (Jan. 9, 2018); and Jared Walczak, “Strategies to 
Preserve SALT Deductions for High-Income Taxpayers: Will They 
Work?”(Jan. 5, 2018); and David Gamage, “Charitable Contributions in 
Lieu of SALT Deductions,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 12, 2018, p. 973.
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II. Background
Section 170 establishes that taxpayers may 
deduct charitable contributions made to 
qualifying organizations. Section 170(a) provides 
that the deduction is available for “any charitable 
contribution” made within the tax year. Also, 
section 170(c) defines the phrase charitable 
contribution to include not only gifts to 
conventional nonprofit entities but also “a 
contribution or gift to or for the use of a State, a 
possession of the State, or any political 
subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the United 
States or the District of Columbia, but only if the 
contribution or gift is made for exclusively public 
purposes.”5 While commonly overlooked in 
popular commentary on charitable giving, the 
provision allowing deductions for gifts to 
governments has been part of federal tax law for 
nearly 100 years.6
In general, when a donor receives some 
benefit, either directly or indirectly, from making 
an otherwise qualifying charitable contribution, 
the amount of their deduction under section 170 is 
reduced by the value of that benefit.7 The principle 
at work here is one of substance over form. To the 
extent of the benefit received, the donor’s 
contribution is treated as arising from non-
charitable impulses and thus not deductible as a 
charitable gift. The treatment of the non-gift 
portion of those contributions depends on the 
nature of the benefit received, although when the 
donor receives goods or services the usual 
approach is to treat that portion of the transfer as 
a purchase. Importantly, this quid pro quo rule is 
not limited to situations in which the donor 
receives goods or services directly from the donee 
organization. A donor’s receipt of indirect 
benefits, whether from a specific third party or 
otherwise, has the same effect on the amount 
deductible under section 170.8 Consistent with the 
rule’s mooring in substance over form, the 
emphasis is on whether the donor has received 
some benefit, not on the specific route that benefit 
took to find its way to the donor.
These rules have considerable intuitive appeal. 
Without them, taxpayers could easily convert 
nondeductible personal consumption into 
deductible charitable gifts. Nevertheless, as we 
detailed in our earlier article, the law has not 
treated the tax benefits of charitable giving as the 
type of benefit that requires a reduction in the 
amount of the donor’s charitable contribution 
deduction. Indeed, we have been unable to identify 
a single instance in the century-long history of the 
federal charitable contribution deduction in which 
a taxpayer was required to reduce the amount of 
her deduction by the value of tax benefits 
generated by making a gift. Instead, the law has 
emphasized that the tax consequences of charitable 
giving are to be disregarded in determining the 
amount of a charitable contribution deduction.9 
This rule has applied for all tax benefits — federal, 
state, and local — and regardless of whether the 
taxes reduced would have been deductible.
To illustrate the operation of these rules, 
suppose first that a taxpayer in the top federal tax 
bracket (facing a marginal tax rate of 37 percent) 
contributes $1,000 to a charitable organization like 
the United Way. Assuming the taxpayer itemizes 
her return, deducting this contribution yields a 
federal tax benefit of $370 to the taxpayer, making 
the net cost of the contribution for the taxpayer 
only $630. This is the full deduction rule in 
operation — that is, the taxpayer is entitled to a full 
deduction for the $1,000 gift, even though making 
the gift reduces her tax liability by $370. We suspect 
that few readers would find this treatment unusual 
or controversial. Nevertheless, it is worth noting 
that even in this commonplace example, the 
taxpayer has managed to eliminate $370 of 
ordinarily nondeductible federal income tax 
liability by making a deductible payment. She has, 
in effect, deducted $370 of her federal income taxes, 
despite the express nondeductibility of federal 
income taxes in the IRC.105
Section 170(c)(1).
6
Revenue Act of 1921, section 214(a)(11), 42 Stat. 227 (1921). 
Contributions to governmental entities were included in estate tax 
charitable deductions beginning with the Revenue Act of 1918. Revenue 
Act of 1918, section 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 300 (1918).
7
Reg. section 1.170A-1(h)(2)(i).
8
See, e.g., Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422-423 (Ct. Cl. 
1971); Ottawa Silica v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Rev. 
Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
9
See, e.g., Skripak v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 285 (1985) (finding “a 
taxpayer’s desire to avoid or eliminate taxes by contributing cash or 
property to charities cannot be used as a basis for disallowing the 
deduction for that charitable contribution”).
10
Section 275(a)(1).
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Next, suppose that the recipient of the 
taxpayer’s $1,000 contribution is the federal 
government, rather than the United Way. As 
before, the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction of 
$1,000, which yields a tax benefit of $370, making 
the net cost of the contribution $630. The 
availability of a deduction for the full $1,000 
contribution does not change simply because the 
donee organization is the source of the tax benefit 
resulting from the gift. Once again, there is 
nothing unusual or controversial in this 
treatment. It is simply a straightforward 
application of the law’s equal treatment of direct 
and indirect benefits. Under the full deduction 
rule, the tax benefits of giving are ignored in 
determining the amount of the donor’s deduction, 
regardless of whether the donee entity is the 
source of those tax benefits.
Put differently, what matters in determining 
the amount of the charitable contribution 
deduction is the nature of the benefit accruing to 
the donor, not the source of that benefit. If a donor 
makes a gift to either the United Way or the 
federal government and because of that gift 
receives, say, Super Bowl tickets from the NFL, the 
amount of the donor’s charitable contribution 
deduction must be reduced by the value of the 
tickets, even though the donor receives them from 
the NFL rather than from the donee organization. 
For both tickets and taxes, direct and indirect 
benefits are treated the same: The receipt of Super 
Bowl tickets will reduce a donor’s charitable 
contribution deduction, whether received from 
the donee organization or from the NFL itself. 
Likewise, tax benefits are ignored — and thus will 
not reduce a donor’s charitable contribution 
deduction — regardless of whether the donee 
entity is the source of those benefits.
That the law makes no distinction between 
direct and indirect benefits will be obvious to 
anyone familiar with the law in this area. It is 
expressed most clearly in Rev. Rul. 67-246.11 In that 
case, a local department store supported the 
annual fundraising drive of a charity by awarding 
a transistor radio (worth $15) to each person who 
contributed $50 or more to the charity. Donor B 
contributed $100 to the charity and received a 
transistor radio. Noting that “the fair market 
value of any consideration received for the 
payment from any source must be subtracted from 
the total payment,” the IRS concluded that only 
$85 of B’s payment qualified as a deductible 
charitable contribution. The logic at work here, 
which is supported by subsequent judicial 
authority, is that the source of the benefit received 
by the donor is irrelevant.12 Thus, if there were any 
requirement to reduce the amount of a charitable 
contribution deduction by the value of resulting 
tax benefits (which there is not), that requirement 
would apply the same to all contributions, 
regardless of whether the gift was made to a 
governmental or nongovernmental entity.
Although current law allows taxpayers to 
deduct the full value of their charitable 
contributions despite the receipt of tax benefits, 
Treasury and the IRS could try to change that rule 
by issuing new guidance. It is difficult to predict 
what form this guidance might take, but it most 
likely would include a new requirement that 
taxpayers reduce the amount of otherwise 
qualifying charitable contribution deductions by 
some or all the tax benefits arising from the gift. 
Stated in this manner, the approach still leaves 
open many questions of scope and application. 
For example, would this new requirement extend 
to all charitable contributions, or only to a subset 
of qualifying gifts? And for those contributions 
covered, would the taxpayer be required to 
reduce the amount of the charitable contribution 
deduction by the value of all tax benefits — 
including federal, state, and local tax benefits — 
or only some subset of those tax benefits? Because 
of the multiplying complexities involved in 
requiring that all charitable gifts be reduced by all 
tax benefits, the IRS might adopt a more 
circumscribed approach requiring that any donor 
to a governmental entity must reduce the amount 
11
See Example 11.
12
See also Singer, 449 F.2d at 422-423 (“Plaintiff would have us decide 
the case by distinguishing between a direct or indirect benefit derived. In 
other words, plaintiff would say that if the transferor received, or 
expected to receive, benefits from a transfer to a charitable transferee, 
which benefits were to be received only indirectly, then regardless of the 
magnitude of those benefits, the transfer would still qualify as a 
charitable contribution deduction under section 170. However, if those 
same benefits were received, or expected to be received, directly from 
the transferee, plaintiff would concede that, given a substantial quid pro 
quo, the transfer would not come within the definition of a ‘gift’ or 
‘contribution’ for purposes of deductibility under section 170. Obviously, 
we cannot agree with plaintiff’s distinction.”).
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of her charitable contribution deduction by the 
value of some or all of any tax benefits granted 
by that governmental entity. However, allowing 
a full deduction for gifts outside this more 
circumscribed category despite the presence of 
tax benefits would represent a significant 
departure from current law’s equal treatment of 
direct and indirect benefits. It would also be 
inconsistent with the statute. Section 170 
confers equal treatment for gifts to qualified 
donee organizations without regard to their 
status as, or affiliation with, governmental 
entities. There is no favored “private” category in 
the law.
Independent of those legal points, any 
attempt to adopt a more circumscribed 
approach targeting only tax benefits derived by 
donors making gifts to government entities 
would require drawing fundamentally 
arbitrary — and even discriminatory — 
distinctions among substantively similar 
donees. Indeed, one obvious example of these 
arbitrary distinctions would be allowing a full 
deduction for gifts to private schools but 
disallowing a full deduction for gifts to public 
schools. In many cases it would also entail 
conferring more advantageous federal tax 
treatment for more generous state tax benefits 
(for example, 100 percent tax credits for gifts to 
private schools) than in the case of more modest 
tax benefits (for example, 75 percent tax credits 
for gifts to public schools). Because the statute 
makes no distinction between gifts to private 
schools and public schools, it is hard to imagine 
a legal basis upon which the IRS could assert 
that the distinction would be warranted. Also, 
any rule relying on such arbitrary distinctions 
would likely encourage parties to devise more 
complex arrangements involving some new mix 
of governmental and nonprofit entities to allow 
donors the benefit of the full deduction rule 
outside the circumscribed category. These 
considerations would, in turn, argue in favor of 
eliminating the full deduction rule for all gifts 
to all donees, although, again, that kind of 
approach would create considerable new 
administrative complexity for millions of 
taxpayers and donee organizations.
In the sections below, we consider two 
conceptually distinct sources of administrative 
complexity associated with abandoning the full 
deduction rule. The first concerns 
computational difficulties in determining the 
appropriate amount of the donor’s deduction, 
while the second concerns definitional 
difficulties arising from any effort to allow 
donors to claim a full deduction (undiminished 
by the value of any tax benefits) only for gifts to 
nongovernmental donees. Any attempt to 
eliminate or limit the operation of the full 
deduction rule will have to overcome both 
sources of complexity.
III. Problems With Limiting Full Deduction Rule
A. Complexity in Computing the Deduction
As the examples above illustrate, a major 
advantage of the full deduction rule is its 
administrative simplicity. The amount of the 
taxpayer’s charitable contribution deduction is 
simply the amount of cash or the FMV of 
property donated. By contrast, eliminating the 
full deduction rule would make it difficult — 
and in some cases impossible — for taxpayers 
and the IRS to compute the proper deductible 
amount for charitable contributions. The 
complication arises because the proper 
deductible amount of a contribution (absent the 
full deduction rule) would depend on the value 
of the tax benefits that the contribution creates. 
At the same time, the tax benefits that flow from 
the contribution often depend on the amount of 
the contribution that is deductible by the 
taxpayer. The resulting circularity makes it 
difficult to calculate the correct amount of a 
taxpayer’s contribution deduction. This 
circularity — and the resulting complications — 
is avoided as long as the full deduction rule 
remains in place.
To illustrate, again consider a taxpayer with 
a marginal tax rate of 37 percent who makes a 
$1,000 gift — this time to Entity X, an 
organization that qualifies to receive deductible 
charitable contributions under section 170. 
Entity X could be a section 501(c)(3) 
organization like the United Way, the federal 
government, a state government, a university, a 
public or private elementary school, or any 
number of other qualifying organizations under 
For more State Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
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section 170(c).13 Assume that the IRS modifies or 
reinterprets its regulations to require donors to 
reduce the amount of their charitable 
contribution deductions to these donees by the 
amount of the tax benefit generated by the gift. 
For the moment, we will focus on the federal tax 
benefit inherent in the available deduction. In 
this example, if the taxpayer deducts the $1,000 
contribution on her federal taxes, she receives a 
federal tax benefit of $370. Under the new rule, 
this $370 would be treated as a benefit to the 
donor, and the taxpayer would be required to 
reduce the amount she deducts to $630 ($1,000 
minus $370). This is how the circularity begins: 
The taxpayer’s federal tax benefit from the 
reduced deduction is now only $233 (0.37 
multiplied by $630), so the taxpayer would be 
allowed to deduct $767 of her $1,000 
contribution. But that is not the end of it under 
a regime that eliminates the full deduction rule. 
Additional calculations ensue with each change 
in the amount the taxpayer can deduct affecting 
the tax benefit from the contribution, and vice-
versa, so that computing the taxpayer’s 
allowable deduction is significantly more 
complicated without the full deduction rule.14
The headaches created by eliminating the full 
deduction rule would be even more acute for 
taxpayers seeking to deduct contributions for 
which a state or local tax benefit is available. State 
tax benefits for charitable contributions usually 
take the form of either a deduction or a credit. For 
a deduction, the same circularity problems 
described above apply, except here the 
computational difficulties are exacerbated 
because the value of the state income tax 
deduction is a function of the taxpayer’s state 
marginal tax rate, but the taxpayer’s state 
marginal tax rate depends on her state taxable 
income. In several states the taxpayer’s state 
taxable income is determined directly by 
reference to her federal taxable income, which of 
course depends on the amount of the federal 
deduction allowed. In these states, if we abandon 
the full deduction rule, it becomes impossible to 
determine the amount of the taxpayer’s federal 
charitable contribution deduction without 
knowing the amount of her federal charitable 
contribution. For states that base a resident 
taxpayer’s income on her federal adjusted gross 
income and conform to federal rules for 
determining the amount of the taxpayer’s 
charitable contribution deduction, determining 
her state marginal tax rate (and thus the value of 
her state charitable tax benefit) would be similarly 
unknowable because, again, the amount of the 
federal charitable contribution and the value of 
the state tax benefit is required to determine the 
other.
Even if we could determine the taxpayer’s 
state marginal tax rate (for example, if the state’s 
income tax features a single flat rate), new 
difficulties in computing the proper amount of the 
federal charitable contribution deduction would 
arise for any state that did not adopt the same rule 
as adopted by federal authorities. For example, 
assume again a taxpayer who makes a $1,000 
contribution to Entity X. Assume further that the 
taxpayer is subject to a 37 percent federal 
marginal tax rate and a 10 percent state marginal 
tax rate. This would imply a combined (federal 
and state) tax benefit of $470. Because of the 
circularity problem referenced above, however, 
an algebraic formula would be needed to 
determine the appropriate deductible amount.15 
But of course each state would be free to continue 
applying the full deduction rule and thereby 
allow our hypothetical taxpayer a charitable 
contribution deduction for the full $1,000 for 
purposes of determining her state income tax 
liability, even though some states may choose to 
follow the (presumed here) new IRS 
abandonment of the full deduction rule. Thus, 
different algebraic formulas would be needed for 
13
We begin with this intentionally ambiguous donee entity (Entity X) 
to emphasize that the tax benefits of potential concern to the IRS arise in 
all these settings. Donations to any of these entities entitle the donor to a 
federal charitable contribution deduction, even though this deduction 
reduces the donor’s nondeductible federal income tax liability. Likewise, 
state governments commonly provide tax deductions or credits for 
donations to many of these entities, and those state tax benefits may 
have the effect of reducing the donor’s nondeductible state or local tax 
liability.
14
In some cases, the taxpayer’s allowable tax deduction for the 
contribution could be calculated using an algebraic formula like c/(1 + t), 
where c is the amount of the contribution and t is the taxpayer’s effective 
marginal tax rate. This formula does not hold, however, for taxpayers 
whose income is close to a threshold at which a different marginal tax 
rate applies. It is also difficult to implement this formula when the 
taxpayer’s effective marginal tax rate differs from the statutory tax rate, 
as is often the case because of various phaseouts.
15
For example, c/(1 + tfs), where c is the amount of the contribution 
and tfs is the combined federal and state marginal tax rate.
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different states depending on whether the state 
follows the IRS in abandoning the full deduction 
rule or preserves it.
Additional complexities arise in the case of 
state tax credits. At first blush, it might seem 
easier to implement a rule requiring taxpayers to 
reduce the amount of their federal charitable 
contribution deductions by the value of any state 
charitable tax credits to which they are entitled 
because of making a federally deductible gift. 
Generally, credits are not taken into account in 
determining the amount of the taxpayer’s taxable 
income, but rather are subtracted from the 
taxpayer’s preliminary or tentative tax liability to 
determine her actual final tax liability. Thus, in 
theory it should be easier to determine the value 
of a state tax credit for purposes of requiring 
taxpayers to reduce the amount of their federal 
charitable contribution deductions by that value.16 
In practice, however, state charitable tax credits 
incorporate many different features that 
complicate the determination of the amount of the 
credit available to the taxpayer. For example, state 
charitable tax credits commonly include: (1) state 
law limitations on the amount creditable (so that 
only a portion of the taxpayer’s total gift is 
creditable), (2) different state law limitations 
depending on the taxpayer’s filing status, (3) 
varying state law credit percentages depending 
on the total value of the gift (or whether 
contributions were made in consecutive years), (4) 
different state law rules in terms of the priority of 
the available credit relative to other credits, and 
(5) different state law rules regarding whether 
unused credits can be carried forward and the 
number of years after which any unused credits 
will expire.17 Some of these features of state law 
would complicate the determination of the value 
of the credit to the taxpayer more than others, but 
all have the characteristic of rendering the actual 
value of the credit unknowable until the taxpayer 
has filed her state income tax return for the year in 
which the credit is applied.
This last point deserves emphasis because of 
its relevance to any charitable tax incentive, no 
matter what form it takes. For both deductions 
and credits for charitable gifts, presumably the 
donor has a ballpark sense of the value of the tax 
incentive at the time of the gift. Indeed, the 
donor’s awareness of the ballpark value of the tax 
incentive may be an important factor in her 
decision whether to make the gift in the first place. 
Because of the way tax systems work, however, 
the taxpayer will not know the actual effect of a 
deduction or a credit on her state tax liability until 
she files her state tax return. The taxpayer cannot 
file a state tax return until after the end of the tax 
year in which the contribution is made, and 
typically does not file it until the federal return 
has already been completed. Because it would 
require knowing the value of state tax benefits to 
determine the proper amount of the federal 
deduction, any effort to abandon the full 
deduction rule would require taxpayers to 
complete their state returns before completing 
their federal returns. However, because state 
income taxes typically use federal law 
determinations (for example, adjusted gross 
income, taxable income) as a starting point for 
calculating state income tax liability, it is 
necessary for taxpayers to have already made 
these determinations before turning to their state 
tax returns.
Additional complexity is created for tax 
credits that are transferable. If the value of the 
state credit does not affect the federal treatment of 
the size of the charitable contribution because the 
credit reflects a reduction in state tax liability, as 
under prevailing law, a taxpayer has no basis 
when she transfers the credit.18 If the taxpayer 
were to have the value of her federal contribution 
reduced in some way because the credit 
represents income, then she would have a basis in 
her transferable state credits. The complexities 
discussed above would come into play in 
calculating this basis, heightened by the more 
complicated tax situations of many businesses 
that use these credits. Further, the basis would 
16
A state may make its credit percentage a function of the taxpayer’s 
taxable income, which would result in the same circularity problems 
discussed above. We can generalize this statement by noting that any 
time the value of a state tax benefit is a function of the taxpayer’s federal 
taxable income, it will not be possible to determine the proper amount of 
their federal charitable contribution deduction under any federal rule 
that seeks to reduce the amount of that deduction by the value of the 
state tax benefit.
17
For a partial inventory of charitable tax credits available under state 
individual income tax statutes, see Bankman et al., supra note 3.
18
Tempel v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 341, 353 (2011).
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have to be tracked, potentially through multiple 
taxpayers. It is worth noting that making credits 
transferable is commonly viewed as efficiency 
enhancing. Indeed, there is a significant market in 
transferable credits, so altering how to account for 
their basis would be a considerable — and 
complicated — change.
A potential rule that could avoid some of 
these computational difficulties would involve 
the IRS allowing taxpayers to deduct the full 
amount of their contributions (that is, preserve the 
full deduction rule), but also requiring them to 
include any tax benefits resulting from those 
contributions as income in the next taxable year. 
For example, the taxpayer in the 37 percent tax 
bracket who makes a qualifying contribution of 
$1,000 in 2018 would receive a $1,000 deduction 
in tax year 2018 and recognize $370 of 
additional income in tax year 2019 (that is, the 
economic value of the deduction the taxpayer 
receives under current law). Although this 
approach to eliminating the full deduction rule 
would avoid some computational circularities 
described above, it would involve significant 
new administrative burdens for taxpayers and 
the IRS. For state tax benefits, this approach 
would require expanding IRS knowledge of 
state tax return information. For example, 
calculating the state tax benefit associated with 
a contribution would require knowing the value 
of the state credit (or the taxpayer’s marginal 
tax rate(s), if a deduction) as well as state tax 
liability absent the benefit (assuming the state 
benefit is nonrefundable). An additional 
stumbling block with this approach would be 
doctrinal because it is well established that 
programs that reduce one’s tax liability generally 
do not constitute taxable income.19
B. Definitional Complexity and Line Drawing
It should be clear from the foregoing that the 
full deduction rule enjoys the benefit of 
administrative simplicity. Under the full 
deduction rule, the only information required to 
determine the charitable contribution deduction 
is the amount of money or value of the property 
donated to a qualifying donee. Neither the 
taxpayer nor the IRS need inquire into the federal, 
state, or local tax benefits arising from the gift. By 
contrast, abandoning the full deduction rule 
would require substantial computational 
complexity of the sort described above.
Given the many computational difficulties 
involved in abandoning the full deduction rule, 
the IRS may seek to devise a rule of more limited 
scope — perhaps, for example, requiring only that 
a donor to a governmental entity must reduce the 
amount of her charitable contribution deduction 
by the value of some or all of any tax benefits 
granted by that governmental entity. In our view, 
it is difficult to reconcile that interpretation with 
the text of the statute. Specifically, that approach 
would mean contributions to governmental 
entities were deductible to a lesser extent than 
contributions to nongovernmental entities, even 
though the statute itself creates no such 
distinction.
To illustrate, again consider a taxpayer who 
donates $1,000 to the federal government, and 
who claims the charitable contribution deduction 
for this amount on her tax return. Under the more 
circumscribed rule suggested immediately above, 
this donor could not claim a deduction for the full 
$1,000, but rather could only deduct a more 
limited amount to reflect the value to her of the 
federal deduction. This result is contrary to the 
law’s equal treatment of direct and indirect 
benefits, as discussed above. After all, a donor of 
$1,000 to the United Way receives the exact same 
tax benefit as a donor to the federal government. 
Treating the indirect benefit more favorably than 
the direct benefit would suggest that the bad 
result can be avoided by giving the benefit a more 
circuitous route, which of course is contrary to 
case law requiring that direct and indirect benefits 
be treated the same.
Perhaps more importantly, any effort to apply 
different rules for gifts to governmental donees is 
contrary to the clear meaning of the statute, which 
19
See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 657 (1986) (“the ‘receipt’ of 
tax deductions or credits is not itself a taxable event, for the investor has 
received no money or other ‘income’ within the meaning of the Internal 
Revenue Code”); and IRS, “Coordinated Issue Program Appeals 
Settlement Guidelines: State and Local Location Tax Incentives (I.R.C. 
Sec. 118 SALT)” (Mar. 2, 2011) (reflecting the IRS position that a “SALT 
or [a] similar tax incentive . . . is not income under I.R.C. section 61”).
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generally allows taxpayers to deduct the full 
amount of their charitable contributions,20 
including contributions made to the federal 
government.21 To be sure, cash or property 
transferred from a taxpayer to a qualifying 
organization does not always constitute a 
charitable contribution in the meaning of the 
statute, like when the organization provides 
goods or services to the taxpayer in exchange for 
the contribution. This is, after all, the rationale 
behind the existing quid pro quo regulation. But 
unlike more common quid pro quo situations (for 
example, the tote bag received in exchange for a 
gift to a public radio station), treating tax 
incentives granted by a donee government as a 
quid pro quo would require concluding that 
contributions to the federal government could 
never be fully deducted by taxpayers. And 
because the statute clearly specifies that those 
contributions are deductible, an interpretation of 
the statute that is inconsistent with this rule must 
not be correct.
Additional problems would arise in 
determining when a gift has been made to a 
“governmental entity” that would therefore 
reduce the amount of a taxpayer’s charitable 
contribution deduction by the value of tax 
benefits provided by that entity. In the context of 
the federal government, this issue might arise for 
gifts made to hospitals operated by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. VA hospitals are 
plainly within the scope of donees entitled to 
receive deductible donations under section 170(c). 
The hospitals themselves do not grant tax 
deductions, but these hospitals are plainly part of 
the federal government, and federal law grants a 
tax benefit for donations to these hospitals. Thus, 
if the IRS adopts a rule limiting the deductibility 
of gifts to governmental entities, the rule will 
bring within its scope gifts to VA hospitals. At the 
same time, it is difficult to see why a gift to a VA 
hospital should be treated less favorably than a 
gift to a private hospital.
Similar issues arise for gifts to state or local 
governmental entities. If a donor to a 
governmental entity must reduce the amount of 
her charitable contribution deduction by the value 
of any tax benefits granted by that entity, it will be 
necessary to determine which donee 
organizations constitute “governmental entities” 
and which do not. Although the question might 
appear simple, developing rules to guide 
taxpayer activity in this area would require the 
IRS to wade into a messy and fact-intensive set of 
questions.
A useful illustration of the complexities 
involved includes the Exceptional SC Fund — the 
section 501(c)(3) entity authorized by South 
Carolina law to receive donations to help fund 
private school tuition scholarships for children 
with special needs. This fund was established by 
the South Carolina legislature and is governed by 
a board of directors consisting entirely of persons 
appointed by the Governor and the two 
chairpersons of the House Ways and Means and 
Senate Finance committees. Also, disbursements 
by the fund are governed by a detailed state law 
specifying the terms and conditions for the use of 
the resources. Donations to the fund entitle the 
donor to a 100 percent state income tax credit. 
Given the state government’s role in establishing, 
funding, and operating the fund, it would seem to 
fit within the scope of any new rule limiting the 
application of the full deduction rule for gifts to 
governmental entities. At the same time, however, 
the fund’s status as a section 501(c)(3) 
organization might lead unsuspecting donors to 
conclude that the fund is not a governmental 
entity subject to the new rule and thus that 
contributions to the fund are fully tax deductible 
under the federal income tax.
Another issue involves the source of the tax 
credit for donating to the fund. The Exceptional 
SC Fund itself does not grant tax credits — rather, 
the fund is authorized to receive donations (which 
must be devoted to purposes enumerated in the 
state statute), and it is the state government that 
grants the tax credit. Would it matter that it is not 
the fund itself, but rather its creator, that grants 
the tax credits for gifts to the fund?
Nearly identical issues arise for many other 
types of gifts that might be implicated by a rule 
limiting the deductibility of gifts to governmental 
entities. For example, would a donor making a 
gift to a local public elementary school be 
required to reduce the amount of her federal 
20
See section 170(a).
21
See section 170(c)(1).
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charitable contribution deduction by the value of 
any state tax benefits arising from the gift? Here, 
as with the Exceptional SC Fund, the donee 
organization is not the originator of the tax 
benefits accruing to the donor. The local public 
elementary school would likely be regarded as a 
“political subdivision” of the state (or at least the 
district of which the school is a part would be 
regarded as such), though presumably the school 
or the district or the state could establish a special 
fund to provide financial assistance to the school. 
It is hard to see any principled basis for 
distinguishing among the many permutations 
that parties might devise to facilitate the flow of 
resources from individuals to educational 
organizations.
What about contributions to a public-private 
partnership between a state or local government 
and a charitable organization? The question is 
sure to arise because many charitable 
organizations are at least partially funded by state 
or local governments. In fact, as we detailed in our 
previous article, many state tax credits exist to 
encourage taxpayers to contribute to specific 
public and semi-public charitable organizations.22 
Moreover, the IRS has long recognized “lessening 
the burdens of government” as one of the 
justifying rationales for extending tax-exempt 
status to a section 501(c)(3) organization.23 That an 
entity can substantiate its charitable purpose by 
reference to its role in lessening the burdens of 
government reveals the lack of a sharp distinction 
between “governmental” and 
“nongovernmental” tax-exempt entities. 
Governments and other nonprofits are largely 
engaged in the same activities, including 
education, public welfare, healthcare, and 
environmental protection. Any attempt to limit 
the operation of the full deduction rule only for 
gifts to “governmental” entities would likely 
encourage parties to exploit (and enlarge) the 
already substantial overlap between and among 
the various types of nonprofit entities.
Some commentators have suggested drawing 
a distinction between, on the one hand, a 
contribution to provide for “essential government 
functions,”24 for which a charitable deduction 
would be denied, and on the other hand, a 
contribution to provide for some other charitable 
function, which would remain deductible. Such a 
distinction, like other ad hoc distinctions that we 
have considered, would be problematic. In 
constitutional law, the Supreme Court long ago 
found the “traditional government function” test 
to be unworkable.25 Meanwhile, in tax law, the 
essential government function test continues to 
apply, albeit in narrow and congressionally 
specified circumstances that are inapposite to 
section 170.
Consider the following two contexts in which 
the concept of an essential government function is 
used in tax law. Evaluating essential government 
functions helps determine whether a bond will be 
considered a tax-exempt bond or a private activity 
bond.26 It’s beneficial for the financed project to 
accomplish an essential government function 
because, at least for purposes of this narrow 
exception, such a bond would be tax exempt. 
Moreover, Native American tribes can issue tax-
exempt bonds for only an essential government 
function,27 limiting tribal, but not state and local, 
borrowing. Again, it’s considered beneficial to 
serve an essential government function, and the 
statutory definition is fairly broad.28
Adopting the essential government function 
test for deductible charitable contributions, 
however, is problematic for at least three reasons. 
First, as the above examples illustrate, Congress is 
more than capable of adopting the test in 
circumstances it deems appropriate. Indeed, 
regarding Native American tribes, the same 
section of the IRC that treats tribes less favorably 
than states vis-à-vis the tax exemption makes it 
equally clear that tribes are to be treated as states 
for purposes of section 170.29 Thus, there is a 
strong plain language case against transposing 
the essential government function test (or an 
22
See Bankman et al., supra note 3.
23
Reg. section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2); Rev. Rul. 85-1, 1985 C.B. 177; and 
Rev. Rul. 85-2, 1985 C.B. 178.
24
See Peter Faber, “Do Charitable Contributions Avoid the TCJA 
SALT Deduction Limit?” State Tax Notes, Apr. 23, 2018, p. 309.
25
See Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
26
Section 141(c)(2)(A).
27
Section 7871(c)(1).
28
Section 7871(e).
29
Section 7871(a)(1)(A).
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analogue) into the realm of charitable 
contributions.
Second, transposing the essential government 
function test onto charitable contributions would 
create the same kind of unintended and harmful 
results that we have emphasized throughout this 
report. For tax-exempt bonds, Congress has 
expressed its intent to provide a tax subsidy for 
projects that perform essential government 
functions. But for charitable contributions, 
importing the test would deny the conceptually 
similar subsidy provided by section 170 to 
essential government functions. Thus, importing 
the test would mean that a public school could be 
financed by tax-exempt bonds, but contributions 
to pay for programs in that school would not be 
deductible under section 170. That result would 
be anomalous and at odds with existing 
legislative intent to support essential government 
functions, including through section 170.
Finally, imposing the essential government 
function test on the deductibility of charitable 
contributions would create additional unintended 
consequences. There are numerous hypothetical 
examples, but consider just one. Suppose the 
essential government function test was imported 
into section 170, and a donor wanted to make a 
contribution to fund a sports complex at a local 
high school. Further, suppose that the IRS or a 
court decided that such a facility doesn’t 
constitute an essential government function and 
on those grounds permitted the donor to deduct 
the contribution for federal tax purposes. Would 
that finding mean that a Native American tribe 
could not use tax-exempt bonds to build a sports 
complex at a local high school because the 
complex doesn’t constitute an essential 
government function?
IV. Conclusion
We understand that the proposed state 
contribution-credit programs we have been 
discussing, if enacted, could reduce the revenue 
that the federal government expected from 
capping the state and local tax deduction in the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97). At the same 
time, the IRS, with the stroke of its pen, cannot 
regulate away all unexpected consequences of the 
new tax law. For state contribution-credit 
programs, it is worth noting that in 2017 millions 
of taxpayers subject to the AMT could have taken 
— and did take — advantage of more than 100 
contribution-credit programs in more than 30 
states to receive charitable deductions that offset 
“lost” SALT deductions. In our previous article,30 
we demonstrated why these programs were, and 
remain, grounded in long-standing tax law, 
respected by the IRS and the courts. In this article, 
we have demonstrated in greater depth why the 
full deduction rule is a sound rule of tax 
administration. Thus, to the extent the IRS reacts 
to these programs by restricting the full deduction 
rule, it would be treading on uncertain legal and 
practical grounds. 
30
See Bankman et al., supra note 3.
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